29 December 2007
Democracy and Benazir Bhutto
The inevitably violent death of Benazir Bhutto was a personal loss for anyone who has believed in the progress of mankind--those of us who truly believed that the "End of History" had been reached. She was foolhardy enough to act as if with the force of her personality alone she could overcome the differences between Pakistani society and the Western culture in which she lived, was raised and was educated.
It has been often said that the military is the only public institution in Pakistan that restrains tribal/ethnic rivalries in that contentious society. Those violent rivalries govern relations not only between regions and subcultures in Pakistan, but also between the social strata of the population, making Bhutto a symbol of the dominance of business and politics by wealthy families, and between officially unarmed civilian movements and the military.
It does not require the subversive activity of Al Qaeda to create "chaos" in Pakistan. If we define chaos there as the absence of democracy, all the conditions for democracy not to work already exist in the Pakistani environment. The semblance of order has only existed in that country under the oppressive control of the military. It will probably take a long time for the common desire for peace and prosperity to emerge across factions and social strata and establish the possibility of working democracy in Pakistan.
That society needs to achieve many prerequisites for fulfilling the conditions of Western culture before it can adopt the emblem of Western self-government. It should not be discounted that Western democracy is unsuited to Pakistan. Certainly the violence that took Ms. Bhutto's life will not be eliminated by the imposition of Western democracy on that very different culture.
The inevitably violent death of Benazir Bhutto was a personal loss for anyone who has believed in the progress of mankind--those of us who truly believed that the "End of History" had been reached. She was foolhardy enough to act as if with the force of her personality alone she could overcome the differences between Pakistani society and the Western culture in which she lived, was raised and was educated.
It has been often said that the military is the only public institution in Pakistan that restrains tribal/ethnic rivalries in that contentious society. Those violent rivalries govern relations not only between regions and subcultures in Pakistan, but also between the social strata of the population, making Bhutto a symbol of the dominance of business and politics by wealthy families, and between officially unarmed civilian movements and the military.
It does not require the subversive activity of Al Qaeda to create "chaos" in Pakistan. If we define chaos there as the absence of democracy, all the conditions for democracy not to work already exist in the Pakistani environment. The semblance of order has only existed in that country under the oppressive control of the military. It will probably take a long time for the common desire for peace and prosperity to emerge across factions and social strata and establish the possibility of working democracy in Pakistan.
That society needs to achieve many prerequisites for fulfilling the conditions of Western culture before it can adopt the emblem of Western self-government. It should not be discounted that Western democracy is unsuited to Pakistan. Certainly the violence that took Ms. Bhutto's life will not be eliminated by the imposition of Western democracy on that very different culture.
24 December 2007
Friends in Baghdad
Attacks on America in Baghdad or elsewhere in the Muslim world result from the fact that opponents of the U.S. treat as one our government’s policies and the behavior of American corporations (cf. “Our Friends in Baghdad” by Frederick W. Kagan in the December 21, 2007, Wall Street Journal). In cultures where it is assumed that everyone and everything belongs to the state, no allowance is made for divergence of nationals’ actions and those of the government. This is just as true of societies in the Middle East as of civilizations that have devolved from traditional monarchies including, to a large extent, even France.
Americans, in another debt to the founding fathers of their government, distinguish the actions abroad of their fellow citizens or businesses from those of their state. While the government is charged with protecting each of its citizens from the actions of other members of the society (citizen or not) and from harm caused by foreign persons or entities, it has been slow in taking on this responsibility for shielding the rest of the world from harm caused by its own citizens.
The curse of the Middle East, Iraq one of the main sufferers, is its oil wealth. Oil has made it hostage to the predations of Western corporations as the price of enjoying the resource’s benefits. Now that the radicals of the region have found a way to retaliate for what they see as a common antagonist, perhaps it is time for the governments of the U.S. and its Western allies to control and moderate the actions of their corporations abroad so that their victims are not led to react and jeopardize their nationals’ security.
Attacks on America in Baghdad or elsewhere in the Muslim world result from the fact that opponents of the U.S. treat as one our government’s policies and the behavior of American corporations (cf. “Our Friends in Baghdad” by Frederick W. Kagan in the December 21, 2007, Wall Street Journal). In cultures where it is assumed that everyone and everything belongs to the state, no allowance is made for divergence of nationals’ actions and those of the government. This is just as true of societies in the Middle East as of civilizations that have devolved from traditional monarchies including, to a large extent, even France.
Americans, in another debt to the founding fathers of their government, distinguish the actions abroad of their fellow citizens or businesses from those of their state. While the government is charged with protecting each of its citizens from the actions of other members of the society (citizen or not) and from harm caused by foreign persons or entities, it has been slow in taking on this responsibility for shielding the rest of the world from harm caused by its own citizens.
The curse of the Middle East, Iraq one of the main sufferers, is its oil wealth. Oil has made it hostage to the predations of Western corporations as the price of enjoying the resource’s benefits. Now that the radicals of the region have found a way to retaliate for what they see as a common antagonist, perhaps it is time for the governments of the U.S. and its Western allies to control and moderate the actions of their corporations abroad so that their victims are not led to react and jeopardize their nationals’ security.
20 December 2007
Seizing the Moment in Iraq
General Barry McCaffrey’s report in the December 20, 2007, Wall Street Journal on recently returning from Iraq shows that he has desperately grabbed at the current rationalization for the U.S. invasion in order to give some meaning to the “valor and creativity of U.S. combat forces.” He was apparently convinced of this strategy by General David Petraeus, who has become a front man for neoconservatives frustrated by the failure of Wilsonian goals for world government.
If only it was the point of U.S. intervention in Iraq to end the bitter division in that “nation.” The surge, along with the Sunnis’ “tribal awakening,” has proven to be an effective tool for dampening violence in the country. Indeed, if the U.S. had been appointed by a non-existent global security organization as its official last resort settler of factional disputes, a large military force, even larger than the surge-fortified U.S. occupation, could well have performed that task in Iraq. Unfortunately, that task would not necessarily ever come to an end.
America was led into this war under false pretenses and in a panic over terrorist attacks. Military leaders like Gens. McCaffrey and Petraeus understandably have devised, executed and narrated strategies that effectively carry out the mission that they have been given. However, it is wrong for us to accept a war as good public policy just because it can be performed well by our military. The point of wars is not to win them; they must only be undertaken to accomplish truthfully justifiable national security objectives that are not achievable through peaceful means. Seizing the moment to take advantage of the upper hand provided to us by the surge may allow us to pull out of Iraq and leave the country to deal its dissolution on its own.
General Barry McCaffrey’s report in the December 20, 2007, Wall Street Journal on recently returning from Iraq shows that he has desperately grabbed at the current rationalization for the U.S. invasion in order to give some meaning to the “valor and creativity of U.S. combat forces.” He was apparently convinced of this strategy by General David Petraeus, who has become a front man for neoconservatives frustrated by the failure of Wilsonian goals for world government.
If only it was the point of U.S. intervention in Iraq to end the bitter division in that “nation.” The surge, along with the Sunnis’ “tribal awakening,” has proven to be an effective tool for dampening violence in the country. Indeed, if the U.S. had been appointed by a non-existent global security organization as its official last resort settler of factional disputes, a large military force, even larger than the surge-fortified U.S. occupation, could well have performed that task in Iraq. Unfortunately, that task would not necessarily ever come to an end.
America was led into this war under false pretenses and in a panic over terrorist attacks. Military leaders like Gens. McCaffrey and Petraeus understandably have devised, executed and narrated strategies that effectively carry out the mission that they have been given. However, it is wrong for us to accept a war as good public policy just because it can be performed well by our military. The point of wars is not to win them; they must only be undertaken to accomplish truthfully justifiable national security objectives that are not achievable through peaceful means. Seizing the moment to take advantage of the upper hand provided to us by the surge may allow us to pull out of Iraq and leave the country to deal its dissolution on its own.
15 December 2007
Habeas Corpus Offshore
The adoption by our founding fathers of certain Anglo-Saxon rights, especially the Writ of Habeas Corpus, traced its roots to the Magna Carta. That was a charge imposed upon a medieval king by his nobility. All of them derived their status from their control of property. By the time of the American Revolution, however, secular positions of influence had been separated from control over land. The individual rights that men of influence insisted on in forming a republic now had a life of their own. They were not tied in the Constitution to ownership of property but to wealth-free qualification as a citizen.
The Supreme Court is about to hear arguments about whether the writ of habeas corpus affects the actions of the U.S. government outside the country’s territorial boundaries. It is hard to believe that a lawyerly interpretation of the origins of the Writ would be used to justify linking its applicability to the location in which it might be invoked. Surely, such an interpretation would never be used to exempt the government from the 14th Amendment prohibition against racial discrimination.
America proudly distinguishes itself from other democracies whose governments devolved from the administrations of hereditary royalty. Ours is a republic that does not derive its authority from control over the land, but by designation from the intellects of its people. That authority carries with it its limitations, including the Writ of Habeas Corpus, wherever it is exercised. The Supreme Court will certainly recognize that as an instrument of the people the government of the U.S. cannot disregard the rules under which it operates on their behalf. If the Bush Administration feels strongly enough about its need to suspend the rights of its captives abroad, it has the option to seek a formal declaration of war against them and, consistent with the Constitution, hold them as long as necessary until that war is won.
The adoption by our founding fathers of certain Anglo-Saxon rights, especially the Writ of Habeas Corpus, traced its roots to the Magna Carta. That was a charge imposed upon a medieval king by his nobility. All of them derived their status from their control of property. By the time of the American Revolution, however, secular positions of influence had been separated from control over land. The individual rights that men of influence insisted on in forming a republic now had a life of their own. They were not tied in the Constitution to ownership of property but to wealth-free qualification as a citizen.
The Supreme Court is about to hear arguments about whether the writ of habeas corpus affects the actions of the U.S. government outside the country’s territorial boundaries. It is hard to believe that a lawyerly interpretation of the origins of the Writ would be used to justify linking its applicability to the location in which it might be invoked. Surely, such an interpretation would never be used to exempt the government from the 14th Amendment prohibition against racial discrimination.
America proudly distinguishes itself from other democracies whose governments devolved from the administrations of hereditary royalty. Ours is a republic that does not derive its authority from control over the land, but by designation from the intellects of its people. That authority carries with it its limitations, including the Writ of Habeas Corpus, wherever it is exercised. The Supreme Court will certainly recognize that as an instrument of the people the government of the U.S. cannot disregard the rules under which it operates on their behalf. If the Bush Administration feels strongly enough about its need to suspend the rights of its captives abroad, it has the option to seek a formal declaration of war against them and, consistent with the Constitution, hold them as long as necessary until that war is won.
08 December 2007
Intervening in Zimbabwe
The Arthur Mutambara interview article by John Fund in the December 8, 2007, Wall Street Journal reminds us of the catastrophes caused by the failure of civilized man to intervene in the disorders of Somalia, Rwanda and Afghanistan in the1990s, Darfur the past two years, and others. As Paul Collier explains in his book, The Bottom Billion, economic intervention, or foreign aid, is not enough to bring order to the world’s failed states. The repentance payments of rich remorseful Western societies are so easily diverted to corruption and military protection racketeering.
Successful use of external force always depends on there being a well-organized indigenous movement to spearhead and carry on the repair of the upended regime. The rivalry between Mssrs. Mutambara and Morgan Tsvangirai, the other leading resister to the Mugabe regime, could vitiate the effect of a global military or economic intervention, or a combination of the two. Public or private resources in the West should first be devoted to helping build a unified domestic coalition in Zimbabwe that can lead the subversion of the Mugabe regime and constitute an orderly successor that will be able to manage both the disorientation that will be caused by a military intervention and the ensuing influx of economic and technical aid from the West.
The Arthur Mutambara interview article by John Fund in the December 8, 2007, Wall Street Journal reminds us of the catastrophes caused by the failure of civilized man to intervene in the disorders of Somalia, Rwanda and Afghanistan in the1990s, Darfur the past two years, and others. As Paul Collier explains in his book, The Bottom Billion, economic intervention, or foreign aid, is not enough to bring order to the world’s failed states. The repentance payments of rich remorseful Western societies are so easily diverted to corruption and military protection racketeering.
Successful use of external force always depends on there being a well-organized indigenous movement to spearhead and carry on the repair of the upended regime. The rivalry between Mssrs. Mutambara and Morgan Tsvangirai, the other leading resister to the Mugabe regime, could vitiate the effect of a global military or economic intervention, or a combination of the two. Public or private resources in the West should first be devoted to helping build a unified domestic coalition in Zimbabwe that can lead the subversion of the Mugabe regime and constitute an orderly successor that will be able to manage both the disorientation that will be caused by a military intervention and the ensuing influx of economic and technical aid from the West.
06 December 2007
The Gulf States and Iran
There are at least four reasons to dismiss Max Boot’s call for the Gulf Arab states to take part in a tough sanctions regime or even military action against Iran in his OpEd in the December 5, 2007, Wall Street Journal:
1) These Arab states don’t really feel threatened by a nuclear neighbor. Saddam didn’t need WMD to invade Kuwait, and the Gulf States are used to living under the gun—Israel has, in their minds, always been a menace, and the West always dominated their political life, even when they have oil as their counterbalancing weapon.
2) Leading families, including the royals, in the Gulf States have made a lot of money on Iran’s mullah-provoked Diaspora. This is particularly true of Dubai whose oil brings less and less revenue each day.
3) Most of these states’ landowners will have large capital losses if the mullahs are overthrown and the expatriate Iranians return home for good.
4) Any autocracy across the Gulf, religious or monarchical, is better for the Arab princedoms than a more participatory system of government there. What would the Middle East look like today if Mossadegh had not been ousted by the CIA? How long do we think the Arab royals would have lasted with an orderly secular democratic model next door for their educated youth?
The Gulf States are ruled by a closed society of wealthy merchants and landowners, with their appointed royal families, who realize that having a menace to the West for a neighbor has benefits that outweigh its dangers. They didn’t expect Saddam to break their regional rules of coexistence and, unless Iran does so, they won’t support U.S.-led regime change in that country either.
