30 November 2007
Defining the Job in Afghanistan
Before commenting on three elements of Hans Binnendijk's plan for winning the war in Afghanistan, “Finishing the Job in Afghanistan,” in the November 10-11, 2007, Wall Street Journal, I would like to help define the mission of NATO's International Security Assistance Force. If it is to prevent the Taliban from retaking power, that’s one thing. If it is to pacify the country with a semblance of Western democratic order, that’s quite another. Under the first definition, ISAF has an enemy to defeat; under the second, ISAF is in the business of building a new culture of democracy and the rule of law in Afghanistan.
It appears that Dr. Binnendijk favors the second definition--he believes that the U.S. can work with relatively moderate Taliban leaders. However, splitting one faction of the Taliban from another is different from playing the Iraqi Sunnis against Al Qaeda. If the U.S. wants to win allegiance to a democratic Afghanistan from those moderate Taliban, it will take a long public diplomacy effort.
U.S. goals in Iraq are, to say the least, conflicted. It backs the Shia-led government, while it has been trying to weaken Iran’s influence in Iraq. Iraqi Sunnis seem to have decided to cooperate with the U.S. against Al Qaeda in order to preserve a position of favor in an occupied country rather than to take their chances in a majority-controlled self-governed state. In any case, what is happening in Anbar province is simple power politics compared to the cultural transformation that will be required to make the Taliban partners in a democratic Afghanistan.
I agree that the key to economic development in Afghanistan is agriculture, and an essential element of that objective is to reduce dependence on the poppy trade. However, there seem to be vested interests in crop eradication as the vehicle for achieving that goal. This is apparently endemic in the European approach as much as in U.S. policy (cf. “The Taliban’s Opium War: The difficulties and dangers of the eradication program,” Jon Lee Andersen, The New Yorker, July 9 & 16, 2007). Common lobbying has to be directed at all NATO governments in order to alter that bias.
Finally, I don’t think that the major public-diplomacy effort in Europe should be aimed at getting NATO to fight in Afghanistan in significant numbers. Rather, what is needed to achieve a democratic and orderly Afghan state is economic growth. Afghans are a rational commercial people who will respond to incentives that lead to improvement in their material well-being.
Before commenting on three elements of Hans Binnendijk's plan for winning the war in Afghanistan, “Finishing the Job in Afghanistan,” in the November 10-11, 2007, Wall Street Journal, I would like to help define the mission of NATO's International Security Assistance Force. If it is to prevent the Taliban from retaking power, that’s one thing. If it is to pacify the country with a semblance of Western democratic order, that’s quite another. Under the first definition, ISAF has an enemy to defeat; under the second, ISAF is in the business of building a new culture of democracy and the rule of law in Afghanistan.
It appears that Dr. Binnendijk favors the second definition--he believes that the U.S. can work with relatively moderate Taliban leaders. However, splitting one faction of the Taliban from another is different from playing the Iraqi Sunnis against Al Qaeda. If the U.S. wants to win allegiance to a democratic Afghanistan from those moderate Taliban, it will take a long public diplomacy effort.
U.S. goals in Iraq are, to say the least, conflicted. It backs the Shia-led government, while it has been trying to weaken Iran’s influence in Iraq. Iraqi Sunnis seem to have decided to cooperate with the U.S. against Al Qaeda in order to preserve a position of favor in an occupied country rather than to take their chances in a majority-controlled self-governed state. In any case, what is happening in Anbar province is simple power politics compared to the cultural transformation that will be required to make the Taliban partners in a democratic Afghanistan.
I agree that the key to economic development in Afghanistan is agriculture, and an essential element of that objective is to reduce dependence on the poppy trade. However, there seem to be vested interests in crop eradication as the vehicle for achieving that goal. This is apparently endemic in the European approach as much as in U.S. policy (cf. “The Taliban’s Opium War: The difficulties and dangers of the eradication program,” Jon Lee Andersen, The New Yorker, July 9 & 16, 2007). Common lobbying has to be directed at all NATO governments in order to alter that bias.
Finally, I don’t think that the major public-diplomacy effort in Europe should be aimed at getting NATO to fight in Afghanistan in significant numbers. Rather, what is needed to achieve a democratic and orderly Afghan state is economic growth. Afghans are a rational commercial people who will respond to incentives that lead to improvement in their material well-being.
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