22 March 2008
Moqtada Was Also Wrong
Just like the American public, Moqtada al-Sadr has felt his understanding and sense of control in the Iraq War fluctuate as the U.S. “mission” there has shifted through a series of rationales. From rooting out Al Qaeda, to eliminating weapons of mass destruction, to removing a brutal police state, to establishing a model democracy, to suppressing sectarian violence—many disguises have been adopted to hide the real reason that the Bush Administration was conveniently employed to exert U.S. dominance in Iraq. Above all, “the powers that be” decided that a vulnerable Middle Eastern country sitting on top of one of the world’s three largest deposits of oil was too risky a proposition to be left to the devices of a petty dictator.
Dan Senor and Roman Martinez make clear in their OpEd article (“Whatever Happened to Moqtada?,” The Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2008) that when it believed that it was building a democratic Iraq, the Bush Administration thought it was buying a safe source of energy. Moqtada was also convinced that democracy would assure his majority Shiite community a secure and wealthy future. Both were wrong; so “Plan B” has gone into effect. For the U.S., this would mean possibly staying in Iraq militarily for decades; for Moqtada, it would mean relying on a foreign occupier to protect Shiite safety and Iraq’s border with Iran.
Sorting out the codes of the Iraq War helps in mapping our long-term strategy in the region. “Insurgents” are the Sunni Arabs who have had the most to lose from the establishment of democracy in Iraq: they do not have the oil of the Kurds or the Shiites, not to mention being at a numerical disadvantage. “Militias” guarding Shiite lives and homes were made superfluous by the American “surge,” although they will long have the potential to resist both perceived injustices by the occupying power and a threatening Iran. “Al Qaeda” doesn’t have a dog in this fight, like it does in Saudi Arabia where Sunni Islam is supposedly forced to serve the interests of the infidel West.
The U.S. has two separate challenges to its security that arise in the Middle East: international terrorism and energy dependence. They may be closely related, but they require distinct responses. In any case, trying to impose democracy on the region solves neither of those problems.
Just like the American public, Moqtada al-Sadr has felt his understanding and sense of control in the Iraq War fluctuate as the U.S. “mission” there has shifted through a series of rationales. From rooting out Al Qaeda, to eliminating weapons of mass destruction, to removing a brutal police state, to establishing a model democracy, to suppressing sectarian violence—many disguises have been adopted to hide the real reason that the Bush Administration was conveniently employed to exert U.S. dominance in Iraq. Above all, “the powers that be” decided that a vulnerable Middle Eastern country sitting on top of one of the world’s three largest deposits of oil was too risky a proposition to be left to the devices of a petty dictator.
Dan Senor and Roman Martinez make clear in their OpEd article (“Whatever Happened to Moqtada?,” The Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2008) that when it believed that it was building a democratic Iraq, the Bush Administration thought it was buying a safe source of energy. Moqtada was also convinced that democracy would assure his majority Shiite community a secure and wealthy future. Both were wrong; so “Plan B” has gone into effect. For the U.S., this would mean possibly staying in Iraq militarily for decades; for Moqtada, it would mean relying on a foreign occupier to protect Shiite safety and Iraq’s border with Iran.
Sorting out the codes of the Iraq War helps in mapping our long-term strategy in the region. “Insurgents” are the Sunni Arabs who have had the most to lose from the establishment of democracy in Iraq: they do not have the oil of the Kurds or the Shiites, not to mention being at a numerical disadvantage. “Militias” guarding Shiite lives and homes were made superfluous by the American “surge,” although they will long have the potential to resist both perceived injustices by the occupying power and a threatening Iran. “Al Qaeda” doesn’t have a dog in this fight, like it does in Saudi Arabia where Sunni Islam is supposedly forced to serve the interests of the infidel West.
The U.S. has two separate challenges to its security that arise in the Middle East: international terrorism and energy dependence. They may be closely related, but they require distinct responses. In any case, trying to impose democracy on the region solves neither of those problems.
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