23 February 2005
George W. Bush and His Counselors
President George W. Bush is probably the most reliant of recent U.S. leaders on his circle of advisors. He really believes that the most important decisions he makes as the CEO of the country’s government are selections of subordinates to guide and administer the operations of various federal agencies. His subsequent role is to parrot the policy pronouncements proclaimed by those officials.
Some have called this behavior of the President loyalty; others have labeled it as simply laziness – refusal to second-guess versus failure to manage. It isn’t stupidity. The President has been dogged in his pursuit of the missions of Christian self-reliance and universal democracy. Even if you agree with those goals, you may disagree with his method of achieving them because of their costs and sloppiness. If you reject W’s missionary aims, it does no good to question his intelligence.
George W. Bush is a willing tool of the true-believers around him. They closely reflect his personal objectives. Attacking his reliance on undesirable advisors is truly a lazy man’s tactic – his policies should be challenged on their merits, not on the method of implementation.
President George W. Bush is probably the most reliant of recent U.S. leaders on his circle of advisors. He really believes that the most important decisions he makes as the CEO of the country’s government are selections of subordinates to guide and administer the operations of various federal agencies. His subsequent role is to parrot the policy pronouncements proclaimed by those officials.
Some have called this behavior of the President loyalty; others have labeled it as simply laziness – refusal to second-guess versus failure to manage. It isn’t stupidity. The President has been dogged in his pursuit of the missions of Christian self-reliance and universal democracy. Even if you agree with those goals, you may disagree with his method of achieving them because of their costs and sloppiness. If you reject W’s missionary aims, it does no good to question his intelligence.
George W. Bush is a willing tool of the true-believers around him. They closely reflect his personal objectives. Attacking his reliance on undesirable advisors is truly a lazy man’s tactic – his policies should be challenged on their merits, not on the method of implementation.
14 February 2005
ODA Highlights Institutional Paralysis
In his article in the February 13, 2005, NYT Magazine, “Freedom, From Want,” James Traub characterizes the term, “Official Development Assistance,” as a “studiously neutral” replacement for “foreign aid.” In fact, it is an old name for government-to-government handouts that were popular during the Cold War, and have led precisely to the institutional paralysis that made foreign aid the source of overbearing debt and the font of personal corruption in the developing world. One of the few laudable goals of the Bush administration is to change the measurement of development aid effectiveness from the amount of aid given to the channels through which it is administered.
The lead U.S. government agency for distribution of foreign aid, U.S.AI.D., prefers to deal with Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) rather than with developing country governments for the administration of its tax-policy reduced budget. They can be controlled under U.S. law, and in many cases share the ethical culture of the Bush administration. However, some NGOs are now ambivalent about collaborating with U.S.A.I.D. While they revel in the freedom the umbrella of U.S. force gives them to act in defiance of corrupt or repressive local regimes, they realize, particularly after 9/11/01, that they are easily perceived as being mere tools of U.S. political and cultural invasion.
This may be a challenge for many NGOs. Their very existence may depend on contracts with the U.S. government, if their charitable financial resources are limited. Fortunately, some NGOs, like Medecins sans Frontieres and CARE, have sufficient contributions in money and personal volunteerism, to afford them the freedom to opt out of playing this ambiguous role.
In his article in the February 13, 2005, NYT Magazine, “Freedom, From Want,” James Traub characterizes the term, “Official Development Assistance,” as a “studiously neutral” replacement for “foreign aid.” In fact, it is an old name for government-to-government handouts that were popular during the Cold War, and have led precisely to the institutional paralysis that made foreign aid the source of overbearing debt and the font of personal corruption in the developing world. One of the few laudable goals of the Bush administration is to change the measurement of development aid effectiveness from the amount of aid given to the channels through which it is administered.
The lead U.S. government agency for distribution of foreign aid, U.S.AI.D., prefers to deal with Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) rather than with developing country governments for the administration of its tax-policy reduced budget. They can be controlled under U.S. law, and in many cases share the ethical culture of the Bush administration. However, some NGOs are now ambivalent about collaborating with U.S.A.I.D. While they revel in the freedom the umbrella of U.S. force gives them to act in defiance of corrupt or repressive local regimes, they realize, particularly after 9/11/01, that they are easily perceived as being mere tools of U.S. political and cultural invasion.
This may be a challenge for many NGOs. Their very existence may depend on contracts with the U.S. government, if their charitable financial resources are limited. Fortunately, some NGOs, like Medecins sans Frontieres and CARE, have sufficient contributions in money and personal volunteerism, to afford them the freedom to opt out of playing this ambiguous role.
11 February 2005
Hardware vs. Human Intelligence
In the February 5, 2005, New York Times, Mr. Patrick Redden Keefe reported on the OPEd page that $13 billion of the federal budget is supposed to have been allocated next year to remote intelligence gathering, including the satellite project known as Misty. Lockheed Martin is apparently one of the main recipients of these funds.
Government military contractors spend a lot of money on lobbying for this business – to some degree on the bureaucrats who write the budgets and who operate their systems and equipment. They devote a larger lobbying expense, no doubt, to the reelection campaigns of the members of Congress who vote for bills that appropriate funds to purchase their wares.
The federal government has steadily become the dominant part of the domestic market for these contractors’ products. To the extent that they make products for consumers, or that other domestic corporations supply consumers, companies have increasingly filled orders with products made overseas, where they seek production economies. Of course, this is one of the benefits of globalization. If U.S. companies did not adopt a global manufacturing strategy, they would quickly be overshadowed by foreign producers.
Despite the erosion of America’s trade balance, the exchange rate value of dollar is artificially high, particularly vis a vis the Chinese yuan, the Korean Won, and the Japanese Yen. This is partly the result of a masterful Asian tactic of investing in the dollar in order to permit continued exploitation of the American consumer’s desire to maximize the amount of goods he can buy with his unsaved income. In fact, over the last five years, the amount goods imported into the U.S. has kept pace with the growth of personal consumption, while manufacturers’ shipments have lagged behind.
By default, then, the federal government has grown in importance as the customer of U.S. manufacturers. There are many ways that the needs of the government for goods can be increased – war is one of them, and so are satellite and other high technology methods of collecting intelligence on terrorist enemies (thankfully, we have outlasted our only credible strategic national competitor). The reasons for war and the rationalizations for high-tech intelligence are questionable, except that they create contributions for and employ constituents of politicians.
In the February 5, 2005, New York Times, Mr. Patrick Redden Keefe reported on the OPEd page that $13 billion of the federal budget is supposed to have been allocated next year to remote intelligence gathering, including the satellite project known as Misty. Lockheed Martin is apparently one of the main recipients of these funds.
Government military contractors spend a lot of money on lobbying for this business – to some degree on the bureaucrats who write the budgets and who operate their systems and equipment. They devote a larger lobbying expense, no doubt, to the reelection campaigns of the members of Congress who vote for bills that appropriate funds to purchase their wares.
The federal government has steadily become the dominant part of the domestic market for these contractors’ products. To the extent that they make products for consumers, or that other domestic corporations supply consumers, companies have increasingly filled orders with products made overseas, where they seek production economies. Of course, this is one of the benefits of globalization. If U.S. companies did not adopt a global manufacturing strategy, they would quickly be overshadowed by foreign producers.
Despite the erosion of America’s trade balance, the exchange rate value of dollar is artificially high, particularly vis a vis the Chinese yuan, the Korean Won, and the Japanese Yen. This is partly the result of a masterful Asian tactic of investing in the dollar in order to permit continued exploitation of the American consumer’s desire to maximize the amount of goods he can buy with his unsaved income. In fact, over the last five years, the amount goods imported into the U.S. has kept pace with the growth of personal consumption, while manufacturers’ shipments have lagged behind.
By default, then, the federal government has grown in importance as the customer of U.S. manufacturers. There are many ways that the needs of the government for goods can be increased – war is one of them, and so are satellite and other high technology methods of collecting intelligence on terrorist enemies (thankfully, we have outlasted our only credible strategic national competitor). The reasons for war and the rationalizations for high-tech intelligence are questionable, except that they create contributions for and employ constituents of politicians.
