30 January 2007
Our Options in Iraq
Bret Stephens in his January 30, 2007 Wall Street Journal essay outlined all the prominent proposals for ending America’s adventure in Iraq with reference to President Bush’s undefined goal of “victory.” The only conclusion I can draw is that Bush's way identifies a success result to the invasion as confirmation that the U.S. may act unilaterally around the world without regard for national sovereignty.
The time of playing nice may well be over. If so, we should admit it--that in order to enjoy the pleasures of our economic good luck we can't afford disorder in the world--anywhere.
This strategy means that we are a constant target for terrorism, so our defenses must always be on guard. As Vice President Cheney has pointed out, we need to have the stomach for it. It also means there will be no friendly states abroad--only sycophants and enemies. Welcome to Bushworld.
Bret Stephens in his January 30, 2007 Wall Street Journal essay outlined all the prominent proposals for ending America’s adventure in Iraq with reference to President Bush’s undefined goal of “victory.” The only conclusion I can draw is that Bush's way identifies a success result to the invasion as confirmation that the U.S. may act unilaterally around the world without regard for national sovereignty.
The time of playing nice may well be over. If so, we should admit it--that in order to enjoy the pleasures of our economic good luck we can't afford disorder in the world--anywhere.
This strategy means that we are a constant target for terrorism, so our defenses must always be on guard. As Vice President Cheney has pointed out, we need to have the stomach for it. It also means there will be no friendly states abroad--only sycophants and enemies. Welcome to Bushworld.
24 January 2007
Invade, Embargo, Subvert
Effecting change in Iran’s political system could benefit the U.S. by reducing Iran’s support for hostile actions against Israel and excising its nuclear weapons development program. It appears that the elite in Iran agree with these objectives, but they are hesitant to foment an overthrow of the fundamentalist Islamic regime. That regime has formidable ideological control of the majority of Iran’s public, and the elite are too worn down by centuries of repression at the hands of despotic monarchs, propped up by foreign powers (including the U.S.), to assume responsibility for establishing a more democratic government.
In this situation, America is left with three options:
• Invade, a la Iraq.
• Embargo, risking the alienation of the elite, who would suffer most.
• Subvert the Islamic regime, driving the Iranian elite to establish a democratic, secular system.
The choice to subvert the Islamic regime is one that the U.S. government cannot blithely make in the world today. It is a strategy that is much better suited to private, non-governmental organizations. NGOs with abundant financial resources, provided by wealthy individuals and corporations that see their interests served by secular stability in the Middle East, can be the foil from behind which Western civilization extends the liberal values that it believes will secure its well-being.
Effecting change in Iran’s political system could benefit the U.S. by reducing Iran’s support for hostile actions against Israel and excising its nuclear weapons development program. It appears that the elite in Iran agree with these objectives, but they are hesitant to foment an overthrow of the fundamentalist Islamic regime. That regime has formidable ideological control of the majority of Iran’s public, and the elite are too worn down by centuries of repression at the hands of despotic monarchs, propped up by foreign powers (including the U.S.), to assume responsibility for establishing a more democratic government.
In this situation, America is left with three options:
• Invade, a la Iraq.
• Embargo, risking the alienation of the elite, who would suffer most.
• Subvert the Islamic regime, driving the Iranian elite to establish a democratic, secular system.
The choice to subvert the Islamic regime is one that the U.S. government cannot blithely make in the world today. It is a strategy that is much better suited to private, non-governmental organizations. NGOs with abundant financial resources, provided by wealthy individuals and corporations that see their interests served by secular stability in the Middle East, can be the foil from behind which Western civilization extends the liberal values that it believes will secure its well-being.
22 January 2007
The Resource Curse
The natural resource curse is caused by asymmetric global technological and cultural development. Demand for refining minerals is a worldwide phenomenon. It doesn’t have boundaries because of communications. But social cycles are much less universal, reflecting different values and the physical compartmentalization of humanity.
This mix creates the potential for “corruption” in the eyes of the West. On the other hand, it creates an opportunity for community advancement in the eyes of traditional societies by means of the success of one of their members. After all, who pays when “corruption” corrupts?—not the community, but the West.
This philosophy may be short-sighted. When the traditional community achieves parity with the West, it will pay equally for contemporary corruption. But when that happens, it is not likely that payback for previous frauds will be extracted.
The natural resource curse is caused by asymmetric global technological and cultural development. Demand for refining minerals is a worldwide phenomenon. It doesn’t have boundaries because of communications. But social cycles are much less universal, reflecting different values and the physical compartmentalization of humanity.
This mix creates the potential for “corruption” in the eyes of the West. On the other hand, it creates an opportunity for community advancement in the eyes of traditional societies by means of the success of one of their members. After all, who pays when “corruption” corrupts?—not the community, but the West.
This philosophy may be short-sighted. When the traditional community achieves parity with the West, it will pay equally for contemporary corruption. But when that happens, it is not likely that payback for previous frauds will be extracted.
What Price War?
On Sunday, 21 January 2007, Tim Russert commented on the NBC News that the American public was questioning whether the Iraq war was worth the price. That was an odd characterization of their displeasure with Bush Administration policy. It begs the question, What price is the war in Iraq worth?
If the public has concluded that it was deceived by the Administration into supporting the U.S. invasion of Iraq, then the entire expense has surely been a waste. If the public was taken in by the DOD strategy espoused by former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that Saddam could be overthrown on the cheap and that the Iraqi people would welcome their liberators with flowers, then it has retreated a long way from the aspiration of President Kennedy’s Inaugural Address over 40 years ago—“We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”
Have we truly advanced the cause of liberty by invading Iraq? We certainly have not created security for its people. How free can they be if they are in danger of losing their lives?
It is not the mission of the U.S. to restore order to a state that was only kept together by brutal repression. And if it is the responsibility of the U.S. Government to assure access for its citizens and corporations to energy resources in a volatile region of the world, then the price we pay for that oil will include the “external diseconomy” of human suffering. That was already included in the price when Saddam ruled—back to square one.
On Sunday, 21 January 2007, Tim Russert commented on the NBC News that the American public was questioning whether the Iraq war was worth the price. That was an odd characterization of their displeasure with Bush Administration policy. It begs the question, What price is the war in Iraq worth?
If the public has concluded that it was deceived by the Administration into supporting the U.S. invasion of Iraq, then the entire expense has surely been a waste. If the public was taken in by the DOD strategy espoused by former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that Saddam could be overthrown on the cheap and that the Iraqi people would welcome their liberators with flowers, then it has retreated a long way from the aspiration of President Kennedy’s Inaugural Address over 40 years ago—“We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”
Have we truly advanced the cause of liberty by invading Iraq? We certainly have not created security for its people. How free can they be if they are in danger of losing their lives?
It is not the mission of the U.S. to restore order to a state that was only kept together by brutal repression. And if it is the responsibility of the U.S. Government to assure access for its citizens and corporations to energy resources in a volatile region of the world, then the price we pay for that oil will include the “external diseconomy” of human suffering. That was already included in the price when Saddam ruled—back to square one.
Dennis Kucinich on Iraq
Congressman Dennis Kucinich has published his “plan” for extricating the U.S. from Iraq. Kucinich doesn't have a plan--he has a wish list. Get the U.N. to manage the reconstruction of Iraq? Come on!
He's right about one thing. The British certainly owe reparations for having set Iraq up in the first place, after WWI, as a Sunni-run source of oil. The U.S. owes reparations for allowing Bush to invade the country and screw up the tolerable, although distressingly repressive status quo ante.
Maybe the only way out will involve paying Moqtada Al Sadr to lead a Shia takeover on condition that he control if not disband his and other violent militias.
Congressman Dennis Kucinich has published his “plan” for extricating the U.S. from Iraq. Kucinich doesn't have a plan--he has a wish list. Get the U.N. to manage the reconstruction of Iraq? Come on!
He's right about one thing. The British certainly owe reparations for having set Iraq up in the first place, after WWI, as a Sunni-run source of oil. The U.S. owes reparations for allowing Bush to invade the country and screw up the tolerable, although distressingly repressive status quo ante.
Maybe the only way out will involve paying Moqtada Al Sadr to lead a Shia takeover on condition that he control if not disband his and other violent militias.
12 January 2007
The Iron Cage
In his review in the 7 January 2007 New York Times of Rashid Khalidi's book, The Iron Cage, Clyde Haberman notes three powers that have kept Palestinians in their place: UK, Israel, and US. They have not done it alone.
Who Haberman fails to mention are the oil-rich Arab states who have not shared their oil wealth with their resource-poor, but intellectually strong and entrepreneurial brothers. Many of these countries have, indeed, devoted much of their treasure to fighting Israel through terrorism and by supporting civil unrest in the Levant. They have invited Palestinian talent into their business communities as hired professional help. But this invitation was always begrudge. Gulf Arabs have resented Palestinians’ ability to apply their expertise in the fast-growing economies of their own less materialistic societies.
The Palestinians have been cordoned off from their own land because of the Crusades and the creation of the modern Zionist state. But, they have suffered equally by the siphoning of their talents into oil-rich states without repayment through investment in the development of their own indigenous economy.
In his review in the 7 January 2007 New York Times of Rashid Khalidi's book, The Iron Cage, Clyde Haberman notes three powers that have kept Palestinians in their place: UK, Israel, and US. They have not done it alone.
Who Haberman fails to mention are the oil-rich Arab states who have not shared their oil wealth with their resource-poor, but intellectually strong and entrepreneurial brothers. Many of these countries have, indeed, devoted much of their treasure to fighting Israel through terrorism and by supporting civil unrest in the Levant. They have invited Palestinian talent into their business communities as hired professional help. But this invitation was always begrudge. Gulf Arabs have resented Palestinians’ ability to apply their expertise in the fast-growing economies of their own less materialistic societies.
The Palestinians have been cordoned off from their own land because of the Crusades and the creation of the modern Zionist state. But, they have suffered equally by the siphoning of their talents into oil-rich states without repayment through investment in the development of their own indigenous economy.
Resolving Iraq
Is the key to resolving sectarian violence in Iraq the division of that country created at the end of the colonial era into three more ethnically homogeneous states? It is not likely that the borders of the Hashemite kingdom of Iraq were drawn in order to spread the benefits of oil production over a wide population some of whom were potentially resource-poor. Nevertheless, that has become an issue in resolving the future disposition of the Iraqi state.
It is an issue for the Kurdish population who dominate one of the main oil-producing regions of Iraq around Kirkuk. It complicates the potential emergence of a wealthy ethnic pole neighboring a rebellious region of Turkey also dominated by Kurds. It is an issue for Shiite Arabs in Iraq’s southern region whose crude oil funnels through Basrah. Because of their religious affinity with the ruling mullahs of Iran, the direction of their affairs is pulled into alignment with the interests of the neighboring Persian giant. Finally, it is an important issue for the once-dominant Sunni Arabs in Baghdad and Anbar province in the center of Iraq. This region has only a history of political rule over the country and mercantile / cultural leadership going for it, with no natural resource endowment of its own.
The U.S. has been trying to rescue its policy of intervention in Iraq by influencing the majority government it has installed there to conduct the country’s affairs in a manner that suits American or Western values. Those secular values are familiar to the professionals who administer the operations of Saudi Arabia’s oil monopoly, ARAMCO. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been an ally of the U.S. in its invasion of Iraq and is quite interested in protecting the welfare of Sunni Arabs in that country. It appears that the Kingdom’s public sector oil producer has the expertise and orientation to operate Iraq’s oil industry in a way that would be considered even handed economically. Perhaps its being contracted to advise Iraq’s Ministry of Oil on its operations after the pullout of American troops would give confidence to Sunni insurgents that they would get a fair shake. This should be a part of the U.S. strategy to quell Iraq’s current violent civil war.
Is the key to resolving sectarian violence in Iraq the division of that country created at the end of the colonial era into three more ethnically homogeneous states? It is not likely that the borders of the Hashemite kingdom of Iraq were drawn in order to spread the benefits of oil production over a wide population some of whom were potentially resource-poor. Nevertheless, that has become an issue in resolving the future disposition of the Iraqi state.
It is an issue for the Kurdish population who dominate one of the main oil-producing regions of Iraq around Kirkuk. It complicates the potential emergence of a wealthy ethnic pole neighboring a rebellious region of Turkey also dominated by Kurds. It is an issue for Shiite Arabs in Iraq’s southern region whose crude oil funnels through Basrah. Because of their religious affinity with the ruling mullahs of Iran, the direction of their affairs is pulled into alignment with the interests of the neighboring Persian giant. Finally, it is an important issue for the once-dominant Sunni Arabs in Baghdad and Anbar province in the center of Iraq. This region has only a history of political rule over the country and mercantile / cultural leadership going for it, with no natural resource endowment of its own.
The U.S. has been trying to rescue its policy of intervention in Iraq by influencing the majority government it has installed there to conduct the country’s affairs in a manner that suits American or Western values. Those secular values are familiar to the professionals who administer the operations of Saudi Arabia’s oil monopoly, ARAMCO. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been an ally of the U.S. in its invasion of Iraq and is quite interested in protecting the welfare of Sunni Arabs in that country. It appears that the Kingdom’s public sector oil producer has the expertise and orientation to operate Iraq’s oil industry in a way that would be considered even handed economically. Perhaps its being contracted to advise Iraq’s Ministry of Oil on its operations after the pullout of American troops would give confidence to Sunni insurgents that they would get a fair shake. This should be a part of the U.S. strategy to quell Iraq’s current violent civil war.
04 January 2007
What Bush Has Done for America
President Bush stated one of his principles clearly and starkly in the January 3, 2007, Wall Street Journal: “… when America is willing to use her influence abroad, … the world is more secure.” That influence is not economic or political; it is military and forceful. The world’s security is not defined as what’s best for the globe’s communities, but what serves the interests of Bush’s financial and partisan supporters – the sale of weapons and military equipment, as well as the establishment of order where his corporate supporters have much at stake.
Sure, it would be criminal to ignore the growth of a sanctuary for international terrorists anywhere in today’s interconnected globe. Al Qaeda in Afghanistan taught us that lesson. However, the lesson was not to create fictional threats to the safety of Americans out of petty dictatorships like Saddam’s Iraq.
Bush has squandered America’s influence in the world by invading and disrupting the tense balance of rivalries in the cradle of civilization. Although the humanitarian costs of imposing that balance have not been congruent with American values, eliminating those costs is not our mission. We continually learn about humanitarian crises in the world that we choose not to alleviate -- e.g. Rwanda, Darfur, etc. It was only after the fact that this objective was proposed as a rationale for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The unusual sacrifice – monetarily, in American and Iraqi casualties, and in global respect – turned out to be falsely justified by arguments claiming Saddam’s WMD and links to Al Qaeda. America cannot continue to use her influence this way.
President Bush stated one of his principles clearly and starkly in the January 3, 2007, Wall Street Journal: “… when America is willing to use her influence abroad, … the world is more secure.” That influence is not economic or political; it is military and forceful. The world’s security is not defined as what’s best for the globe’s communities, but what serves the interests of Bush’s financial and partisan supporters – the sale of weapons and military equipment, as well as the establishment of order where his corporate supporters have much at stake.
Sure, it would be criminal to ignore the growth of a sanctuary for international terrorists anywhere in today’s interconnected globe. Al Qaeda in Afghanistan taught us that lesson. However, the lesson was not to create fictional threats to the safety of Americans out of petty dictatorships like Saddam’s Iraq.
Bush has squandered America’s influence in the world by invading and disrupting the tense balance of rivalries in the cradle of civilization. Although the humanitarian costs of imposing that balance have not been congruent with American values, eliminating those costs is not our mission. We continually learn about humanitarian crises in the world that we choose not to alleviate -- e.g. Rwanda, Darfur, etc. It was only after the fact that this objective was proposed as a rationale for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The unusual sacrifice – monetarily, in American and Iraqi casualties, and in global respect – turned out to be falsely justified by arguments claiming Saddam’s WMD and links to Al Qaeda. America cannot continue to use her influence this way.
